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Does Shariʿa Play a Role in Turkey? 
Russell Powell* 
 
This essay introduces my empirical research exploring Turkish 
perceptions of law and religion.1  I returned from Istanbul in the summer of 
2013, having recently completed the data collection.  I have studied Turkey 
for nearly thirty years and first lived there in 1990.  Since then, I have visited 
regularly to teach and conduct research.  On my most recent trip, I stayed in 
the Taksim district of Istanbul, where I often stay during my visits.  
However something was different this time.  On May 31, 2013, in response 
to the use of police force against a small group of nonviolent demonstrators, 
massive protests broke out; it was not the first time in recent weeks that riot 
police used tear gas and water cannons.2 
At 7:30 PM on May 18, I was walking to a café on Istiklal Avenue to 
meet with a graduate student I was mentoring.  Hundreds of police blocked 
the street and thousands of people were trapped, trying to move away from 
the riot police.  Like many locals with places to be, I used side streets to 
avoid both the mob and the police attempting to herd it.  At one point, the 
police blocked every direction.  Tear gas enveloped the crowd.  People 
started to panic.  I started to cough, and my eyes watered from the gas.  I 
took shelter in a nearby restaurant.  Locals were unsurprised by the riot 
tactics deployed against a Saturday evening crowd made up mostly of 
tourists, young people, and families.  There were no reports of the incident 
in the local media, and I still do not know what prompted such an intense 
 
 *  Dr. Russell Powell is a Professor of Law at Seattle University School of Law and serves as 
the Associate Provost for Global Engagement at Seattle University; his research is primarily in the 
field of Islamic jurisprudence. 
 1.  The data discussed herein will be published in my forthcoming book, SHARIʿA IN THE 
SECULAR STATE: EVOLVING PERCEPTIONS OF LAW AND RELIGION IN TURKEY. 
 2.  See, e.g., Constanze Letsch, Turkey Protests Spread After Violence in Istanbul Over Park 
Demolition, GUARDIAN (May 31, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/31/istanbul-
protesters-violent-clashes-police. 
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police response. 
I ventured out for dinner on May 26 and stumbled upon hundreds of 
police lining Istiklal Avenue.  I thought eating at home would be safer, so I 
bought takeout and returned to my apartment.  At 7:15 PM, I heard 
explosions and screaming.  From my apartment window just two blocks off 
Istiklal, I saw packs of police chasing civilians in the street.  Tear gas seeped 
into my apartment through the closed windows.  I retreated to the bathroom 
and ran hot water in an attempt to keep the gas at bay.  For thirty minutes I 
held my position, hoping the gas would dissipate.  My neighbors were 
irritated, but unsurprised.  Again, no one knew what had prompted this 
intense response by police. 
There are constant demonstrations of one variety or another in the 
Taksim area.  In May 2013 alone, I saw Kurdish protests, anti-Russian 
protests, and a host of leftist and environmentalist demonstrations.3  Most 
were small and typical, frequently consisting of university students.  This 
has been the state of affairs for decades, but the response this year lacked the 
restraint of the past.  Once this type of police power exercised against 
earnest students and environmentalists (something more easily done in Gezi 
Park than the narrow paths of Istiklal) was documented in social media, it 
tapped into deep anger and frustration directed at the government.4  This 
massive and spontaneous grassroots reaction reflects a deep alienation of 
those who are likely to be the next generation of Turkish leaders. 
I interviewed many people who expressed deep frustration at the 
ongoing consolidation of power by the ruling party.  Even religious 
supporters of Prime Minister Erdoğan expressed concerns about the use of 
excessive police force, the concentration of wealth in the ruling party’s 
supporters, the prospect of enforced religious norms, and constitutional 
reform.  Although the protests that escalated on May 31 included religious 
individuals and supporters of the ruling party, the anger focused on Prime 
 
 3.  See Ayse Bugra, Turkey: What Lies Behind the Nationwide Protests?, OPENDEMOCRACY 
(Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/ayse-bugra/turkey-what-lies-behind-
nationwide-protests. 
 4.  See Alex Fitzpatrick, Turkey Protesters Take to Twitter as Local Media Turns a Blind Eye, 
MASHABLE (June 3, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/06/03/twitter-turkey-protests; Eric Pfanner, 
Turks Angry over Dearth of Protest Coverage by Established Media, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/world/middleeast/turks-angry-over-dearth-of-protest-coverage-
by-established-media.html. 
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Minister Erdoğan and what some believe to be his agenda of “Islamization.”5  
Some viewed recent changes to laws regulating alcohol and the ban on 
public displays of affection as clear evidence of this program.6 
My research has focused on the dynamic relationship between religion 
and law in contemporary Turkey.  Many polls (including my own) indicate 
that a notable percentage of Turks want “Shariʿa” (a term of art, the 
meaning of which I attempt to unpack and clarify in this study7) to be 
enforced by the state.8  However, my evidence shows that these people 
seldom consider what it might mean in terms of its effect on civil law.  
There is often a disconnect between supporting an adoption of Shariʿa and 
supporting the regulation of everyday behavior through civil codes.  It is 
clear from others’ research, and it is supported by my own, that even 
religious people do not want Turkey to transform into an Iran or Saudi 
Arabia.  In fact, many of the religious people I interviewed believe that 
robust protection of religious freedom enhances their own religious 
experience by making it both more meaningful and more authentic.  This 
attitude suggests that religious belief and individual choice are not only 
valued but may also enhance each other.  I believe that changing Turkish 
law to conform to classical Islamic legal norms is likely to provoke far 
greater public opposition than the response evoked in June 2013, even from 
many people of faith. 
Turkey is a very religious country in that polling consistently indicates 
that a significant majority of Turks identify as religious.9  In this regard, it is 
not so different from the United States: both countries are home to religious 
politicians who propose to bring state law into greater conformity with 
ethical and religious norms rooted in their faith.  When their actions are 
 
 5.  Tim Arango & Ceylan Yeginsu, Peaceful Protest over Istanbul Park Turns Violent as Police 
Crack Down, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/01/world/ 
europe/police-attack-protesters-in-istanbuls-taksim-square.html. 
 6.  See Cinar Kiper, Muslim Light: What’s Behind Turkey’s Islamization and the Protests 
Against It, ATLANTIC (June 5, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/06/ 
muslim-light-whats-behind-turkeys-islamization-and-the-protests-against-it/276576/. 
 7.  See infra notes 16–22 and accompanying text. 
 8.  See infra notes 13–15 and accompanying text. 
 9.  See Religion Loves Tolerance, but Is Not Tolerant, HURRIYET DAILY NEWS (Nov. 17, 2009), 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=8216religion-loves-tolerance-but-
is-not-tolerant8217-2009-11-17 (“Eighty-three percent of Turks identify themselves as religious . . . 
.”). 
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viewed as overreaching, there is public outcry.  The tradition of Kemalist 
secularism (laiklik) is often cited to distinguish Turkey as an exceptional 
case among predominantly Muslim countries.10  While it is true that the 
Turkish Constitution, laws, and legal opinions treat the relationship between 
the state and religion differently than Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and even 
Indonesia, it would be wrong to underestimate the role of religion in the 
formation of Turkish legal norms and citizens’ understanding of those 
norms.11   
There is a wealth of literature describing the evolution and nature of 
Turkish secularism.12  A number of quantitative and qualitative studies 
question and analyze Turkish voters’ preferences for Shariʿa.13  The typical 
question asks whether respondents favor the establishment of a Shariʿa 
state.14  Over the past fifteen years, these surveys have received responses in 
favor of such a state ranging between 5% and 25%.15  However, these results 
are extremely problematic because they do not explore what respondents 
mean by “the establishment of a Shariʿa state,” either for those who favor it 
or for those who oppose it.  This essay draws on two years of empirical 
research and begins to unpack the range of possible meanings attributed to 
Shariʿa among Turkish voters as a framework for future empirical studies 
and as a basis for deeper understanding of the role of Islam within Turkish 
 
 10.  Russell Powell, Evolving Views of Islamic Law in Turkey 1 (Mar. 15, 2013) (working paper), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2233550. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  See, e.g., FEROZ AHMAD, THE MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY (1993); ZEYNO BARAN, TORN 
COUNTRY: TURKEY BETWEEN SECULARISM AND ISLAMISM (2010); SONER CAGAPTAY, ISLAM, 
SECULARISM AND NATIONALISM IN MODERN TURKEY: WHO IS A TURK? (2006); ALEV ÇINAR, 
MODERNITY, ISLAM, AND SECULARISM IN TURKEY: BODIES, PLACES, AND TIME (2005); ANDREW 
DAVISON, SECULARISM AND REVIVALISM IN TURKEY: A HERMENEUTIC RECONSIDERATION (1998); 
CARTER VAUGHN FINDLEY, TURKEY, ISLAM, NATIONALISM, AND MODERNITY: A HISTORY, 1789–
2007 (2010); YAEL NAVARO-YASHIN, FACES OF THE STATE: SECULARISM AND PUBLIC LIFE IN 
TURKEY (2002); ESRA ÖZYÜREK, NOSTALGIA FOR THE MODERN: STATE SECULARISM AND 
EVERYDAY POLITICS IN TURKEY (2006); RETHINKING MODERNITY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN 
TURKEY (Sibel Bozdoğan & Reşat Kasaba eds., 1997); BRIAN SILVERSTEIN, ISLAM AND 
MODERNITY IN TURKEY (2011); BERNA TURAM, BETWEEN ISLAM AND THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF 
ENGAGEMENT (2007); M. HAKAN YAVUZ, ISLAMIC POLITICAL IDENTITY IN TURKEY (2003); ERIK J. 
ZÜRCHER, TURKEY: A MODERN HISTORY (2004). 
 13.  See, e.g., ALI ÇARKOĞLU & BINNAZ TOPRAK, RELIGION, SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN A 
CHANGING TURKEY (Jenny Sanders ed., Çiğdem Aksoy Fromm trans., 2007).  
 14.  Id. at 33. 
 15.  Id.  
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law and politics.  
My broader empirical project is intended to describe contemporary 
Turkish understandings of Shariʿa, to test a popular thesis that education 
best predicts views toward Shariʿa, and to provide a more thorough 
description of Turkish views on law and religion than is currently available.  
It also challenges the modernist claim that personal religiosity is predictive 
of preference for a religious state.  This research project includes two 
quantitative surveys as well as qualitative interviews.  Many questions are 
based on studies by Pew,16 the World Value Survey (WVS),17 Ali 
Çarkoğlu,18 and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu19 in order to make valid comparisons with 
similar polling conducted in Turkey and in other countries.  I conducted 
screening interviews with several hundred people, primarily in the Beyoğlu 
neighborhood of Istanbul, and detailed open-ended interviews with three 
groups of Turkish citizens, including two groups representing the range of 
independent variables,20 and a third consisting of university students, recent 
university graduates, and six people active in the Hizmet Movement (also 
sometimes called the Gülen Cemaat or simply the Cemaat).  This allowed 
me to develop a fuller description of religious experience relating to law, and 
to consider possible causal mechanisms.  
This project explores the evolving understandings of Shariʿa and the 
causal mechanisms that may influence individual attitudes toward the 
relationship between religion and the state in Turkey.  The project employs 
multiple methodologies for the purposes of triangulation, with adult Turkish 
citizens as the target population.  The first large-N survey was a thirty-seven 
question telephone poll using standard representative polling strategies.  The 
questions probed for preferences and perceptions of Shariʿa.  Across the 
country, 935 random phone numbers were called, controlling for population 
 
 16.  The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society, PEW RESEARCH (Apr. 30, 2013), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-beliefs-about-
sharia/.  
 17.  WORLD VALUES SURVEY ASS’N, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ (last visited Mar. 3, 
2014). 
 18.  Ali Ҫarkoğlu, Religiosity, Support for Şeriat and Evaluations of Secularist Public Policies in 
Turkey, MIDDLE E. STUD., Mar. 2004, at 111. 
 19.  ERSIN KALAYCıOĞLU, PARTY IDENTIFICATION, ISLAM AND SECULARISM IN TURKEY (2007), 
available at http://research.sabanciuniv.edu/8954/1/ISA_2008_ersin_k.pdf. 
 20.  Education and religiosity are the two main independent variables, each with a value of 
lower, middle, or higher, for a total of nine combinations. 
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distribution.  A far more extensive survey in Turkish was posted online 
through SurveyMonkey.com.  The online survey was completed by 301 
participants.  Significant correlations in the telephone poll and the online 
survey create a basis to explore causal inferences, in particular that level of 
education achieved is a more important factor than degree of religiosity 
expressed for producing particular views of Shariʿa.  The face-to-face 
interviews allowed me to ask follow-up, open-ended, and “why” questions 
that provided a much deeper understanding of Turkish views of law and 
religion. 
The surveys established demographic status through background 
questions regarding age, gender, residence, ethnicity, religion, and other 
factors.  The chief independent variables, education and religiosity, are 
based on self-reporting questions.  The dependent variable, preference for 
Shariʿa, is based on responses to the statement “I would like to have a 
Shariʿa-based religious state founded in Turkey.”  Questions presented to 
respondents were formed using Turkish wording very similar to that used in 
prior studies in order to enable statistically significant comparisons with 
prior polling.  One of the goals of this research was to provide a deeper 
understanding of the relationship between Islam and law in Turkey, which 
requires some understanding of the classical context of Islamic jurisprudence 
as well as contemporary Turkish approaches. 
“Islamic law” is such a problematic term that some scholars refuse to 
use it.  It is a broad, imprecise term.  Shariʿa, often translated as “Islamic 
law,” refers to the ideal of God’s law as understood within Islam, similar to 
the ideal of divine law in medieval Christian jurisprudence.21  Since divine 
law is not knowable with certainty, human attempts to apprehend it are 
subject to error.  There are multiple approaches to understanding Shariʿa 
within Islamic jurisprudence.22  The human exercise to ascertain Shariʿa is 
referred to as fiqh, or Islamic jurisprudence.23 
Although there is sympathy for the traditional fiqh approach among 
many Turkish Muslims, the most influential approaches to jurisprudence are 
 
 21.  See The World’s Muslims, supra note 16. 
 22.  See, e.g., ANDREW RIPPIN, MUSLIMS: THEIR RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND PRACTICES 74 (John 
Hinnel & Ninian Smart eds., 2005).   
 23.  Clark B. Lombardi, State Law as Islamic Law in Modern Egypt: The Incorporation of the 
Shariʿa into Egyptian Constitutional Law, in 19 STUD. IN ISLAMIC LAW AND SOC’Y 11 (Ruud Peters 
et al. eds., 2006). 
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modern because they do not rely on madhab rules in a posture of taqlid.24  
This might be more obvious within a civil law jurisdiction that is decidedly 
secular, but lack of madhab institutions and codification of Shariʿa make 
most contemporary approaches to Islamic jurisprudence “modern” in some 
sense.25  There is a range of views concerning Islamic law in Turkey, but it 
can be argued that the official state position plays a central role in shaping 
Islamic practice and understanding of religious jurisprudence.  Although 
they have importance, I do not consider here the arguably more heterodox 
approaches of the Naqshbandiyya, the Mevlevi, or the Alevi. 
The Turkish government plays an active role in shaping the structure of 
religious institutions and the content of religious teaching—unlike in the 
U.S. under the doctrine of nonestablishment.  According to the Turkish 
Constitution, “The Directorate of Religious Affairs [Diyanet], which is 
within the general administration, shall exercise its duties prescribed in its 
particular law, in accordance with the principles of secularism, removed 
from all political views and ideas, and aiming at national solidarity and 
integrity.”26  To American readers, this section of the Turkish Constitution is 
challenging.  It belies their completely different understanding of the 
relationship between religion and the state. 
The Directorate (sometimes translated as Presidency) of Religious 
Affairs (Diyanet) controls religious education, ordination and licensing, the 
construction of mosques, the appointment of Imams, and even dictates the 
specific content of Friday sermons throughout the country.27  It represents 
the highest Islamic religious authority in the country and is in some sense the 
successor to the Sheikh ul-Islam.28  Diyanet has a budget of nearly one 
billion dollars (USD) and plays an important role in—and for—Turkish 
society.29 
Although there is no official content or method attributed to Shariʿa, the 
 
 24.  Id. at 41–46. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY Nov. 7, 1982, art. 136 (as amended). 
 27.  THIJL SUNIER ET AL., DIYANET: THE TURKISH DIRECTORATE FOR RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS IN A 
CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 51–52 (2011), available at http://www.fsw.vu.nl/nl/Images/ 
Final%20report%20Diyanet%20February%202011_tcm30-200229.pdf. 
 28.  Id. at 9–20.  
 29.  See 2006 Maly Yili Butcesy, MUHASEBE KITAPLARI (Oct. 18, 2005), 
http://www.alomaliye.com/ekim_05/2006_mali_yili_butcesi.htm. 
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position of Diyanet implies a particular approach to law and theology, 
suggesting it can be interpreted as an alternative to traditional fiqh.  Diyanet 
issues legal opinions that typically, but not always, reference the Qur’an, 
hadith, and Hanafi texts.30  However, its opinions are not limited by Hanafi 
fiqh.  For example, in 2005, the head of Diyanet appointed two women as 
vice-muftis, an action which is arguably inconsistent with the traditional 
Hanafi position.31 
In regard to the range of approaches to Islamic jurisprudence described 
above, Diyanet clearly manifests three.  It relies on traditional fiqh rules and 
tends to refer to the Hanafi school for legitimacy.32  Even so, it is modern in 
its attempts to harmonize tradition with Turkish republicanism and 
secularism, and to provide religious counsel to Turkish citizens.  This 
sometimes manifests itself in the selection of alternative classical rules (e.g., 
non-Hanafi rules).  In other cases, rulings are based on new interpretations 
of texts or broad public policy arguments.  Diyanet officials are very careful 
to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Turkish Republic and its secular 
constitution.  Thus, Islam tends to be imagined as a religious and moral 
system that speaks to all aspects of life, but which is not imposed on the 
legal system.  Although official Islam in Turkey (as understood by Diyanet 
officials) is not private per se, it is viewed as existing in a sphere insulated 
from politics and separate from civil law. 
Turkey has moved closer to Europe under the leadership of a party 
rooted in Turkey’s Islamist politics, despite early republican efforts to cut 
Turkish ties to Islam and separate the politics of the new regime from 
religion.  The approach to secularism in Turkey has evolved since the 
founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923 (though it has roots in the 
structural reforms of the Tanzimat period),33 but the 2001 constitutional 
amendments increased the textual importance of strict secularism.  
Secularism (laiklik) is a core principle of Kemalist ideology from the 
founding of the Turkish Republic and appears throughout the Turkish 
Constitution.  The Preamble prohibits religious interference in state affairs 
 
 30.  Diyanet maintains a collection of its fatwas and even offers a phone service to answer 
religious questions.  See http://www.diyanet.gov.tr.  
 31.  See the Diyanet website, http://www.diyanet.gov.tr, for a discussion of clergy and Islam. 
 32.  See SUNIER ET AL., supra note 27. 
 33.  See, e.g., FINDLEY, supra note 12, at 91–106. 
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and politics.34  The Constitution defines Turkey as democratic and secular, 
with the strength of its language indicating the importance of secularism to 
its drafters.35  The establishment of state organs to control religion is 
consistent with French secularism, while incorporating authority over 
religion within the state apparatus is patently inconsistent with the U.S. 
tradition of separation of church and state.36 
There are numerous sources of popular religious views in modern 
Turkey.  Television has become perhaps the most influential and ubiquitous, 
but print media and traditional publishing remain important.37  In this study, 
Fethullah Gülen was the single most mentioned influence, but outside of 
communities inspired by his work, those interviewed had deep reservations 
regarding his followers, if not the man himself.38  Yaşar Nuri Öztürk was 
also mentioned by a significant number of those interviewed, and is worth 
considering in depth.39  Other religious scholars mentioned were Nihat 
Hatipoğlu, Zekariya Beyaz, Sait Nursi, and Mevlana Jelaluddin Rumi.40  
Several writers were mentioned in the interviews, including poet Ismet Özel 
and writers Ömer Tuğrul İnanҫer, Halit Ertuğrul and Dücane Cündioğlu.41  
Political leaders also seem to provide some degree of religious inspiration of 
guidance, particularly Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Gül.  Today’s 
Zaman newspaper42 and Samanyolu TV,43 along with a plethora of religious 
media publishers and broadcasters, have perhaps the greatest influence in 
shaping views related to religion and law.44 
 
 34.  THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY Nov. 7, 1982 pmbl. (as amended) (“[N]o 
protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to Turkish national interests, Turkish existence 
and the principle of its indivisibility with its State and territory, historical and moral values of 
Turkishness; the nationalism, principles, reforms and civilization of Atatürk and that sacred religious 
feelings shall absolutely not be involved in state affairs and politics as required by the principle of 
secularism . . . .”). 
 35.  Id. at art. 2. 
 36.  Kim Shively, Taming Islam: Studying Religion in Secular Turkey, 81 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 
683, 684 (2008). 
 37.  See infra App. A. 
 38.  See infra App. A. 
 39.  See infra App. A. 
 40.  See infra App. A. 
 41.  See infra App. A. 
 42.  TODAY’S ZAMAN, http://www.todayszaman.com (last visited Mar. 7, 2014). 
 43.  SAMANYOLU TV, http://www.samanyolu.tv (last visited Mar. 7, 2014). 
 44.  See infra App. A. 
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Although the nineteenth century saw significant developments in 
Islamic law, it generally continued within the fiqh tradition.  The Sunni 
community in the Ottoman Empire was led by the Sultan, who had the title 
and authority of Caliph, Sunni jurisprudence was taught in Madrasas,  and 
the Sheikhs al-Islam advised the Sultan and issued legal opinions.   
Consistent with the jurisprudential tradition, the state played a central role in 
interpreting and enforcing norms identified with Shariʿa. 
In 1877, Islamic legal rules were codified with the enactment of the 
Mecelle, which integrated a number of European civil law traditions.45  As a 
result of the Revolutiuon of 1923, Turkey adopted a policy of  “modernization” 
by abolishing the Caliphate, dismantling madhabi institutions, founding the 
Turkish Republic based on a secular constitution, and enacting civil codes.  
Three particularly notable approaches to adapting the  Islamic tradition of 
jurisprudence in Turkey and promoting secularism are evident in Turkey 
today: Diyanet, Öztürk, and Gülen.  Of these three approaches, Diyanet and 
Gülen are the most influential—they continue to maintain mosques, schools, 
and civil society networks throughout Turkey.  While Öztürk rejects the 
tradition of fiqh altogether, Diyanet and Gülen seem open to 
recontextualizing the rules of fiqh while continuing to appreciate their 
importance and value to Turkey.  It is still unclear which approach to Islamic 
jurisprudence will ultimately capture the popular support needed for large-
scale adoption, if any.  As this study shows, the approach favored by the 
people of Turkey remains ambiguous.  Recent tension between the AKP 
government and Gülen-affiliated institutions is likely to have a significant 
impact on views of religion and law going forward. 
Islamic law in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire continued to 
develop, but still operated within the context of traditional fiqh.  Madrasas 
trained scholars in Sunni schools of thought, the state enforced Shariʿa rules, 
a Caliph led the community, and a Sheikh al-Islam answered complex legal 
questions.  The attempt to integrate European code traditions into Islamic 
law in the enactment of the Mecelle in 187746 was consistent with other early 
modernist attempts at legal reform.  This led to a more complete disconnect 
 
 45.  See Report of the Commission Appointed to Draft the Mejelle, 1 ARAB L. Q. 367, 367–72, 
(1986); see also FINDLEY, supra note 12, at 94. 
 46.  See Report of the Commission Appointed to Draft the Mejelle, 1 ARAB L. Q. 367, 367–72, 
(1986); see also FINDLEY, supra note 12, at 94. 
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from tradition upon the founding of the Turkish Republic, the dismantling of 
madhabi institutions, the abolition of the Caliphate, the adoption of a secular 
constitution, and the enactment of civil codes.   
Within the contemporary secular milieu, Diyanet, Öztürk, Gülen and 
others developed new approaches to Islamic law in Turkey.  All three of 
these approaches incorporate elements of modernism.  Although Öztürk 
remains an interesting and important voice, Diyanet and Gülen are more 
influential because they have extensive networks of institutions (mosques, 
schools, and civil society networks).  Diyanet and Gülen both acknowledge 
the importance of traditional fiqh even though they diverge from its rules 
(unlike Öztürk, who rejects the tradition).  The ultimate success of these 
approaches to jurisprudence depends largely on popular support.  However, 
the landscape of understandings among Turkish citizens remains unclear and 
potentially misunderstood.  This uncertainty invites more empirical studies 
on the meaning attributed to Shariʿa or Islamic jurisprudence by Turkish 
citizens. 
The data supports a number of important findings.  First, there is a trend 
of increasing support for Shariʿa within Turkey, and education appears to 
correlate (inversely) with this preference more than religiosity.47  Still, the 
study indicates that Turks under thirty are more likely to be religious than 
those between thirty and fifty and that those under thirty who identify as 
religious are more likely to have a university education.48  It is clear that 
interpretations of Shariʿa in Turkey differ from those in other predominantly 
Muslim countries.  The influence of the Justice and Development Party (in 
Turkish, Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, or AKP) in combining commitments to 
Islamic ethics, center-right politics, neoliberal economics, and Kemalist 
republican values has likely accentuated this distinction by validating the 
consistency of secular constitutionalism and Islam.49 
Turks who desire the enforcement of Shariʿa are more likely to have a 
modernist understanding of how rules are derived and to conceive of a 
sphere of Shariʿa within a constitutional legal system that applies mainly to 
issues of personal status.  It is also clear that Turks increasingly want a legal 
 
 47.  See infra App. A. 
 48.  See infra App. A. 
 49.  See Party Programme, AK PARTI, http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-
programme (last visited Mar. 7, 2014). 
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system that reflects their values.  To the extent that Kemalist secularism is in 
tension with broadly held Islamic values in Turkey, it is likely to be 
unsustainable—as in the case of the prohibition against head-coverings in 
universities.50  This may be especially true for the case of limits on 
individual liberties.  Enforcing new limits on liberty in the name of values 
(or Islam) is likely to evoke strong opposition, as it did in Gezi protests 
against limits on public displays of affection and the sale or use of alcohol.51 
One surprising result from the interviews is the apparent similarity 
between the experience of religious conservatives in Turkey and religious 
conservatives in the United States.  Both groups are employing similar 
strategies and tactics to advance an agenda.  Both groups have intentionally 
invested in specialized education, generated their own press infrastructure 
and supply of entertainment, and created multiple layers of civil society 
organizations, all serving as a basis for political mobilization.  
The rise of private evangelical schools and homeschooling in the United 
States parallels the establishment of imam hatip schools and religiously 
inspired high schools in Turkey.  The rise of Fox News is analogous to the 
growth of Zaman.  In the 1990s, religious conservatives in the U.S. 
supported cable networks including TBN, PTL, and The Family Channel 
and programs like The 700 Club and Touched by an Angel.  Only a decade 
later, Turkish religious conservatives supported Samanyolu, Kanal 7, and 
Dost, with programs ranging from Qur’an classes to The Fifth Dimension.  
The similarities are striking.  It is probable that politicians and business 
leaders were aware of the success of American religious conservatives and 
actively adopted their strategies.  The profound influence of organizations 
inspired by Fethullah Gülen in Turkey may have made the deployment of 
these strategies more consistent and effective.  To their credit, religious 
conservatives have presided over important democratizing reforms and 
laudable economic growth in Turkey.52 
Although there is increasing support for Shariʿa in Turkey, it is unlikely 
that religious leaders would risk losing political or economic influence by 
 
 50.  See Jonathan Head, Quiet End to Turkey’s College Headscarf Ban, BBC (Dec. 31, 2010), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11880622. 
 51.  See Kiper, supra note 6. 
 52.  See Murat Somer, Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey: Implications for the 
World, Muslims and Secular Democracy, 28 THIRD WORLD Q. 1271, 1272 (2007), available at 
http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/boisi/pdf/f09/Moderate_Islam.pdf. 
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proposing constitutional reforms that require conformity with Shariʿa.  
Prohibitions on interest or limiting rights to divorce—Shariʿa rules enforced 
by a number of predominantly Muslim states—would compromise economic 
stability and political support for religious politicians in Turkey.  It is more 
likely that Shariʿa in Turkey will mean expanding religious freedom.  
Periodic attempts to enforce religious norms may occur, but if the Gezi 
Protests provide an example, this type of legal reform is likely to be met 
with significant resistance.  This dynamic seems to indicate that, in terms of 
state law, Shariʿa has been largely privatized.  That is, it has become an 
issue of personal moral conviction.  Even in terms of personal status (family 
law, inheritance, etc.), a province of law where some vision of Shariʿa has 
been codified in most Muslim-majority countries,53 the traditional rules and 
methods of Islamic jurisprudence are not enforced in Turkey. 
 
  
 
 53.  See, e.g., Laura M. Thomason, On the Steps of the Mosque: The Legal Rights of Non-Marital 
Children in Egypt, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 121, 137 (2008) (citing article 875 of the Egyptian 
Civil Code, which subjects inheritances to the provisions of Shariʿa law). 
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